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Time, History and Subjectivity in an “atopic” 
approach to Walter Benjamin’s theses On the 
concept of History
Tempo, história e subjetividade em uma abordagem “atópica” 
das teses de Walter Benjamin em seu ensaio Sobre o conceito 
de história
This article seeks to reflect upon the problems of 
time and subjectivity in the production of historical 
knowledge. Its approach is deeply inspired by the 
thinking of Giorgio Agamben and begins by citing the 
relationship between history and poetry in the 1451 (a, 
b) section of Aristotle’s Poetics. The passage aims at 
establishing a difference between history and poetry, 
which is discussed here with reference to three mythical 
dimensions of Greek temporality — Aiôn, Chrónos, 
Kairós — with the objective of characterizing sketches 
of a conception of time that is different from ours and to 
which the image of the “body of time” is here proposed. 
The dialogue that follows with the theses on Walter 
Benjamin’s On the concept of History brings closer the 
problem of the body of time to the question of action 
and historical subjectivity, questioning the possibility 
of conceiving an image of time most appropriate to 
the constituent action of the historical subject and its 
relationship with the possible.
Time; Subjectivity; Walter Benjamin.
Neste artigo, busca-se refletir acerca dos problemas do 
tempo e da subjetividade na produção de conhecimento 
histórico. A abordagem escolhida é profundamente 
inspirada no pensamento de Giorgio Agamben e parte 
da citação da relação entre história e poesia no trecho 
1451 (a, b) da Poética de Aristóteles. O trecho procura 
estabelecer uma diferença entre história e poesia, 
que é discutida aqui com referência a três dimensões 
míticas da temporalidade grega — aiôn, chrónos, 
kairós — com o objetivo de caracterizar esboços de 
uma concepção de tempo diferente da nossa e para a 
qual se propõe aqui a imagem do “corpo do tempo”. O 
diálogo que se segue com as teses incluídas em Sobre 
o conceito de história, de Walter Benjamin, aproxima a 
problemática do corpo do tempo à questão da ação e da 
subjetividade histórica, indagando sobre a possibilidade 
de conceber uma imagem do tempo mais adequada à 
ação constituinte do sujeito histórico e a sua relação 
com o possível.
Tempo; Subjetividade; Walter Benjamin.
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Aion is a child playing draughts; the kingship is a child’s 
(HERACLITUS, fr.52)
The image of history I cherish is “atopic”. It comes from 
the time when I was a history student and was preparing a 
work on the sans culottes that ended with a question: “Yes, 
after all, the fall of the Bastille happened, but it also happened 
that a child crossed the street to get some loaves of bread at 
grandma’s house”. Naive questioning, for sure; many children 
crossed the street, many women hung clothes on lines through 
the ages, many people passed by, just as the click of a camera 
saved forever their portrait on the background in another 
moment of revolution. However, all these “lapses”, small daily 
absences, are outside history, that is, they have no place in 
an explanatory chain of causes and effects of the event itself, 
in the realms of history. Out of place, therefore, outside the 
historical time in which we produce our texts.
This recurring image of being out-of-history, I found again 
years later in a reading of H. Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday 
Life (1958, see intro and chapter 6). But it is in Everyday Life 
in the Modern World that an atopy, very close to that of mine, 
is expressed:
Suppose you have before your eyes the collection of calendars 
printed since 1900. From that pile you take one at random, which 
comes to be a year at the beginning of the century. Then you 
close your eyes and mark a blind day with the tip of a pencil. It 
is the 16th of June […]
[…] Leaning on the press and the periodicals of this not so 
distant time, […] you can now dream. On this day, wouldn´t 
there something essential, which did not appear in the news, 
have happened? […] No one can blame you if you think that on 
that day an imperceptible, but irreversible slip (an apparently 
unimportant decision of a banker or a minister) has accelerated 
the move from a competitive capitalism to another capitalism 
[…]  You can even imagine, at the beginning of the summer, 
under the sun of the Solstice of Gemini, among the usual noises 
of a village or of some city, the birth of children destined (but 
why?) to become acutely aware of these things and of this time. 
(LEFEBVRE 1991, p. 5-6)
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Lefebvre immersed himself in a potent dialogue with 
literature, drawing on Marxist philosophy and the context that 
enabled him to elaborate the fundamental and critical links 
of Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, moving towards 
the problem of alienation and freedom of the subject by the 
footprint of the possible in everyday life. However, the enormous 
importance of his thought for history, the preoccupation with 
temporality, formulated in the first volume of Critique, unveils 
its horizon in literature, theater, and cinema, and does not 
explicitly propose as a problem the way of writing stories 
that have time as its fundamental landmark, historiography; 
after all, a conjecture such as “suppose that Einstein between 
lucidity and delirium had formulated on June 16 the theory of 
relativity […]” (LEFEBVRE 1991, p. 5-6), it still presupposes a 
judgment of posterity on significant and universal facts, and 
therefore presupposes a certain attitude before what becomes 
historical. However, what if it were not Einstein, but his first 
wife, for instance, while sipping some tea? What if the theory 
of relativity had never happened, and the afternoon of June 
16 had been nothing but an afternoon of study and calculation 
in the life of a public official dedicated to science? And what if 
Einstein had not been delirious; would he still be an ordinary 
Einstein a posteriori acknowledged as subject, portrait and 
biography in historical time? The valorization of the historical 
leap immanent to everyday life delineates a frontier, which is 
precisely that which is fundamental to Marxism, the frontier of 
becoming, of historical time thought dialectically as crisis and 
mutation (GANDLER 2009, p. 118-127). The boundary of linear 
time, or rather, dialectical linearity (or spiral) of historical time 
(MARQUES 2016).
 Can historical time be another? In Futures Past (2006), 
Koselleck delineates the concept of historical time from the 
fundamental dynamics at play in the various conceptions of 
time and mutation present in historical literature, but also in 
the newspaper texts, in the images and ideas that he analyzes. 
Koselleck, thus, sheds a light and gives some unity to our 
expectations regarding human history as a present link between 
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past and future. In this process, he differentiates historical time 
from natural, chronological time grounded in the measurements 
of mathematics and physics, making historical time look like 
the image delineated from the “space of experience” and the 
“horizon of expectation”, even though anchored effectively (but 
not necessarily) in the natural movement of time (KOSELLECK 
2006, p. 308). Historical time, therefore, is human time; and 
its dynamics depend on a horizon of expectations that is also 
human. It is this historical time presupposed at the heart of a 
horizon of expectations that I need to put in question. Therefore 
it is necessary to make our expectations of historical time (and 
natural time) somewhat stranger.
To find time “odd” means “to be surprised”, in principle, 
with the linearity past - present - future in a chain of causes 
and effects. We already do this when we propose, for example, 
studies on memory, truth, orality, etc. However, what about 
contexts, what are they? In other words, what is this that is 
theoretically designated as “time” for a “space”? In Agamben’s 
words, we must affirm the possibility of another approach to 
time as kairological, and an understanding of the  temporality 
of Kairós as time as a whole, without a line, and thus without 
instant, without before and after. Time that comes to be in a 
whole, in a conjuncture.
The time of gnosis is therefore an incoherent and non-
homogeneous time, whose truth lies in the moment of abrupt 
interruption in which man takes up, with a sudden act of 
consciousness, the very condition of resurrection [...] Coherently 
with this experience of interrupted time, the attitude of the Gnostic 
is resolutely revolutionary: it rejects the past, but reassesses in 
itself, through an exemplary presentiment, precisely what had 
been condemned as negative... but without expecting anything 
from the future. (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 123)
An interrupted time, but whose “denial” of continuity needs 
to be experienced without the support of the line and the circle. 
The challenge is, therefore, to express conceptually a historical 
temporality “setback”, de-structuring it. For this, unlike the 
way Agamben presents Greek thought according to a western 
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conception of temporality, I believe that a mythical image of time 
among the Greeks may indeed provide us with an idea outside 
of that line and thus helps us to rethink the eternal return as 
an opening rather than a closure. Therefore, I begin by citing 
three dimensions of Greek temporality, discussing how they are 
articulated to the historiography and / or poetics of their time. 
I try to evoke, in fact, myth and poetry, bringing them to the 
center of a contemporary questioning about time and history.
Greatly simplifying it, “History” is a Greek word linked to 
popular justice in its quest for the truth of events (see FOUCAULT 
2002, p. 53-55; HARTOG 2003, p. 53-76; CERQUEIRA 2009). 
The hístor is the one who saw and can testify what happened. 
From this condition of eyewitness emerges among the Greeks 
the figure of the historian as someone who can, according to 
oneself and its own pretension, address the people to witness 
what under what circumstances something has happened 
(VEYNE 1984, p. 15-26; DARBO-PECHANSKY 1998, p. 48-82).
The historian in the polis coexists with other religious and 
intellectual figures capable of plotting events in a myth, in 
a story that is told: the poets, the rhapsodists, the fortune-
tellers, the decipherers of divine oracles, and so on. The word 
may be Greek, but the meaning it has acquired throughout 
the last centuries of European history must be imputed only 
partially to the ancients (see the studies organized by LIANERI 
2011). The first measure that must be taken for the historian to 
become the narrator / questioner of past events is to separate 
this time, to make it distinct, to confer upon it a certain status 
with respect to knowledge: the time between the near and the 
distant, between the causes and the effects of our present life 
is the one in which the linearity of the eyewitness unfolds. Even 
though in Greek and Roman ancient times this temporality has 
assumed a role in the historical narrative (FONTANILLE 2015, 
p. 171-192), the connection between linear time and mutation 
The hístor and the myth
158
Marta Mega de Andrade
Hist. Historiogr. v. 12, n. 29, jan-abr, ano 2019, p. 153-178 - DOI: 10.15848/hh.v12i29.1374
by the becoming of a society / civilization will predominate 
only from the nineteenth century on (MOMIGLIANO 1983; 
VLASSOPOULOS 2007, p. 11-95).
Therefore, this measure was not taken first hand by the 
people who used the word “history” to designate the inquiry. 
Neither Homer, nor Herodotus, nor Thucydides created “history”. 
As Finley affirms (FINLEY 1989, p. 3-27, and seq.), they were 
certainly interested in the memory of past deeds, mainly as a 
kind of proof — in the agonistic sense of the term — than as a 
science. In his constructive criticism of the myth, the history 
of Herodotus, as Thucydides’ paleography, did not claim his 
primacy over the truth of the facts at a time of a yesterday, but 
sought to erect “truer” monuments/ memorials that… However, 
“truer” does not mean (yet) more real or factual, but, precisely, 
purged from the mythical, critical elements of its vain words 
(VEYNE 1984, p. 71-83; GINZBURG 2002, p. 47-63).
There is an effective closeness between poetry and history in 
this Athenian context, which means a closeness between agents 
— poets, philosophers, historians — and between techniques 
and knowledge from the perspective of a social field. Aristotle 
affirmed in Poetics 1451a-b that poetry is more philosophical and 
more serious than history, for the first speaks of the universal, 
whereas the domain of the latter is the particular, that is, one 
brings to light what could happen and the other addresses “what 
Alcibiades did”. But how can we understand this statement 
without situating it in the discursive and rhetorical context of 
the Poetics, without placing, at the same time, a minor question 
about the “community of interpretation” implied by the Stagirite 
as it provides us with those lines that overflow from the specific 
subject of the Poetics and proceed towards a (possible) debate 
among “intellectuals” of that time?
What is of history and what is of poetry do not differ because of the 
pronouncing with or without meter. In fact, what is in Herodotus 
could be put in meter and still it would be a type of History, in 
meter or not. Otherwise, they both differ because one [history] 
talks about what happened and the other [poetry] about what 
had to happen. For this reason, poetry is more philosophical and 
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more zealous than history, for poetry speaks of the universal, 
while history speaks of the particular. By “universal”, I call what 
one will do or say according to what is possible or necessary. 
“Particular” is what Alcibiades did or suffered. […] From what 
he said it is clear that the poet should not be a maker of verses 
but of myths, since he is a poet by virtue of mimesis, and what 
he mimics is the action. Even supposing that he mimics what 
happened, he is still a poet, for there is nothing to prevent 
some events from being the kind of ones that would happen, 
possibly or inevitably, and that is why he is the “fabricator” […]. 
(ARISTOTLE, Poetics, 1451 a-b).1 
The narrative of history is that which deals with the events 
that have taken place and which derives from the particularity 
of an agent — “what Alcibiades did or suffered”. Poetry 
differs from this because even when it tells what happened to 
Achilles or Odysseus, it is not about this or that person but of 
characters. Alcibiades is someone who lives in the ephemeral 
and human-mortal time (birth, growth, death). Heroes, like 
the characters of poetry and tragedy, are poeticized by the 
activity of mimesis, constituting themselves, therefore, not as 
persons who live in time, but as characters who unfold timeless 
lines of action (ethos). On the other hand, the historian does 
not “poetize”, he talks about what he knows / saw in relation to 
what happened in the past. This separation that leads poetry to 
the universal (and thus the lines of characters to the universal) 
and history to the particular (of the life “in that day” of this or 
that person) is not yet the one between the real and the fiction. 
The distance between “what Alcibiades did” and the action of 
a hero like Theseus, who in this sense is understood under the 
sign of the particular and the universal, escapes from what 
has “happened” in a human time and goes in the direction of 
the question of truth. In short, Aristotle’s solution leads us to 
distinguish the truth or truer philosophical, poetic, universal 
order, from human time-space of events or deeds, suggesting 
that there is no “more truth” to be sought, in principle, in man’s 
lived time (WEISS 1941, p. 173-180, and seq.).
Such controversies are expressed elsewhere in the way 
historians criticize the myth. The Herodotean autopsy, for 
1 - The passage is 
part of an ongoing 
translation of the first 
part of Poetics by 
Marta M. de Andrade 
and Stephania S. Gi-
glio, based on an edi-
tion by Paulo Pinheiro 
(2015).
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instance, could be considered, according to Darbo-Pechansky 
(1998, p. 185-214) and Hartog (1999, p. 15-30)  an instrument 
that seeks to give the author’s opinion a more credible status 
in contrast to poetry and myth. To convince by shifting the 
credible in the sense of the visible and the lived, being careful 
to keep the lines of action of the heroes and the narratives 
of the poets intact, was part of the work of Herodotus: 
Agamemnon led the Greeks in the Trojan War, the kidnapping 
of Io caused the kidnapping of Helena and the insane Greeks 
retaliated against the barbarians because of a woman… 
(Herodotus, Histories I, 1, 1-5) Thucydides does differently: 
Agamemnon led the Greeks into the Trojan war, but they were 
all looters and that is all about that war (Thucydides, History 
of the Peloponnesian War I, 1, 23); his concern seems to 
have been to criticize these events with much more interest in 
those who were contemporaries to him, based on documents 
that he had at hand or could consult and traditions which he 
knew and depurated; no mythical element would survive in 
his archeology of the Peloponnesian War (GINZBURG 2001, 
p. 42-84). This historian seems to have overcome the problem 
of autopsy, having placed the narrative of the deeds of men in 
the record of that eternity and of the universality that Aristotle 
would still preserve after him for poetry.
Aristotle taught poetic lessons to his disciples at least a 
generation after Thucydides, and twice as much in relation to 
Herodotus. The interposition of history in the lessons of poetics 
suggests the presence and the debate around a very lively 
problem that separated the truth of ideas (poetic, religious) from 
the truth of the facts, the one that was verified in the courts and 
depended on certain procedures of investigation. Poetic, religious 
and philosophical truth having at its side this other homonymous 
truth applied in separating from the false through investigation 
and submitted to the scrutiny of the courts of the city. If the 
Poetics of Aristotle refers to the first and the Histories of Herodotus 
to the second, the paleography of Thucydides constitutes a good 
step on the bridge between one and another, but with a detail 
that separated it from historians and philosophers: having as a 
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purpose an eternal good in the form of a true narrative about the 
events that led to war and combating vehemently the mythical 
elements, Thucydides sought to formulate the connection between 
the factual and the possible.
 What it means to say that, as far as the field of knowledge 
is concerned, both for Thucydides or the Aristotle of the Poetics, 
truth would not be experienced as a revelation by time, but as 
a spectacle out of time, a spectacle of the universal “truer” 
drama. The time of poetry is integral (myth, at least in tragedy, 
implies the closed circle of recognition and turnaround). Thus, 
no construction, whether of the word (narrative), spectacle, or 
characters, can be anything other but  total: drama must open 
and close a cycle (PIRES 2014, p. 71-72). It is no wonder that 
Thucydides defines his paleography — writings about ancient 
things — as ktema es aei, an eternal good, forever (Thucydides, 
History of the Peloponnesian War I, 22, 4). He postulates 
identifying from the particular events of the Peloponnesian War 
and its protagonists a wisdom concerning the cyclical unfolding 
of human tendencies. What we call “history” in Thucydides is a 
binding of events to the eternal return; because the temporality 
of the ephemeral, of what is born, grows and dies, does not 
unfold in the same temporal dimension of the past, present, 
future. What was, what is and what will be belong to the Aiôn, 
“forever”, as Chrónos (the movement of becoming). In this 
dimension, it is not what is happening, but what returns equal 
in the form of the different that constitutes the ktema is aeí.
When historiography bases its foundations vividly interested 
in the truth contained in the mutation, inscribed in the becoming 
and perceived as historical time, it also postulates other 
images with which historical time is filled and that allows it to 
act as an instance capable of conferring intelligibility to facts 
and significant factors: time, but also space, individual and 
Aiôn, Chrónos, Kairós
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society. Foucault draws attention to this appropriation of time 
(past, present, future) when he approaches the archaeology 
of the human sciences in Order of Things: Man, subject and 
object of knowledge, in his natural vital movement, a being 
that is born, grows and dies; a being who works and speaks; 
a being that constitutes and transforms one way of life in time 
(FOUCAULT 1999, p. 417-474). A subject who does not master 
his past and for whom the future is a promise. A subject who 
is rational measure of the godless world, in whom the myth 
causes shivers. From then on, the becoming is the becoming of 
man into civilization. And each stage of the process is a dialectic 
construction of the future, overlapping layers, remains, ruins 
and new buildings embedded in them.
The living body of time had, at the very beginning of Greek 
philosophical thought, at least, the three dimensions of Aiôn, 
Chrónos, Kairós, dimensions present in various myths (BAPTISTA 
2010, p. 85-100; BOCAYUVA 2010, p. 399-412, for a brief 
overview of the theme of temporality, for a reflection on the three 
dimensions, see MARRAMAO 2008, p. 397-405, for the connection 
between Aiôn and Chrónos, see WEISS, 1941 and HEIDEGGER 
1983, p. 454-469). Chrónos, “is the time in its indefatigable 
sequence” (BAPTISTA 2010, p. 87), the running of the river, 
events and the (necessary) differentiation. We know the origin of 
our “chronologies”: important dates, regardless of their system 
of  notation, they are points that mark the turning of a continuous 
process. Now it is Heraclitus who gives us also the most famous 
image of the continuum and the flow, in the fr. 91:
For, according to Heraclitus, it is not possible to step twice into 
the same river, nor is it possible to touch a mortal substance 
twice in so far as its state is concerned. But, thanks to the 
swiftness and speed of change, it scatters [things] and brings 
[them] together again, [(or, rather, it brings together and lets 
go neither again nor later, but simultaneously)] it forms and 
dissolves, and it approaches and departs. (HERACLITUS, fr. 91).2
Our sieve directs attention to the becoming as a movement 
of differentiation, equating it with linear time: “You cannot 
step twice in the same river”3 as the waters run inexorably 
2 - http://www.hera-
clitusfragments.com/
files/ge.html  (acess 
4 Feb. 2018)
3 - As in Burnett’s 
version of fr. 91. See 
http://philoctetes.
free.fr/heraclite.pdf 
(acess 4 Fev. 2018)
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towards the mouth and are never the same waters. However, 
it is the whole interpretation by ancient quotes of the fragment 
that speaks of becoming (including by the interventions of its 
commentators) and, according to his sentence, one cannot 
enter twice in the same (river): the same is what’s remarkable. 
This same river disperses and gathers, associates and dissolves, 
approaches and drives away. There is an identity, the same one, 
that acts as the waters pass and they always become different. 
This means that before we take Aiôn, eternity, by inertia or 
continuity in an undifferentiated time, we must consider a 
continuous, cyclical movement of return of an agency (of the 
same river, in this case), for nothing and for no reason because 
it simply “is”. Thus, Aiôn would  be the “soul” of becoming — 
“the original sense of Aiôn is ‘vital force’, as evidenced by its 
approach to psyché” (MARRAMAO 2007, p. 8-10) — in the same 
movement in which Chrónos is its impression in a transitory 
world of sensitive experiences. And about this “sensitive soul” 
of becoming, Heraclitus says that it is child’s play; reign of the 
child (fr 52, see epigraph).
For some views of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the child, 
paîs, does not immediately experience a chronological shape 
of time. In the child’s reign, it plays undoing, disarticulating 
the gears of that machine, until such gears are incorporated 
after the age of seven (BERGER 2005, p. 507-510). Of course, 
the chronological time of the development of subjectivity and 
inscription in the body of the “self” and the “other” is the starting 
point of this understanding, and therefore a starting point is a 
gradual abandonment by the subjectivity of non subjective (in) 
formalities, infans, as De Certeau, for example: the scriptural 
machine that constitutes us liberates (as repressed) quotations 
of infinite voices themselves infans, empty of language and 
playful. (DE CERTEAU 1998, p. 221-258). It is the playfulness 
of the child in the realm of “always”, whose past, present, 
future have not been incorporated and will not be incorporated 
into the game of identity / otherness.
There is a life before birth that gives it dating. There is a world 
before the world in which it arises. There is a fetus before the 
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infans. There is an infans before the puer. Incessantly, there 
is a previous one without language in time: it is time. Fetus, 
infans, before identity are, one and the other, without language. 
The scene where every scene originates in the invisible without 
language is an ever active virtuality (emphasis mine) (QUIGNARD 
2002, p. 14-15).
Therefore, it is not the equality, the inertia, the immutable 
of a kingdom of God, but precisely the soul of a child who 
presides over the game of the eternal return of difference. Aîon 
is like a soul in the body of time. Because it is inspired on 
this infantile reign in the soul, “time” has neither head nor 
face, but has long limbs that love the interlace, as if they were 
contortionists; they go far, they are archaic. In their passage 
through human territories, they walk in a row like Chrónos, 
from the spring to the mouth of the river, that same god that 
in diverse iconographies appears as a very old gentleman 
threatening to cut off the wings of a baby Eros.4 If it were not 
for time, the same time as always, bringing back the game, 
starting again unsuspected of the self, of life, of death, if it were 
not  for that virtuality always active, so active that the Zeus of 
the sharing of cosmos and the prerogatives of the gods had to 
swallow Métis, reversing the Kairós (the “coup”) in his favor, 
if it were not for that and Chrónos would follow indefatigably 
towards the end. However, the “right time” connected to the 
circular wisdoms of métis, or simply the time when everything 
opens, Zeus knows, it is genesis, always. When swallowing 
Métis (HESIOD, Theogony, v. 887, seq.), Zeus gives birth to 
Athena, which means that, curiously, something escapes him 
by the head. Zeus, who knows everything, foresees all, knows 
everything that happens, will happen or has happened. This 
makes him invincible, unbeatable in the intents, but at no time 
does the omniscience of Zeus refer, in mythical accounts, to 
the eternal return that is characteristic of the coup. Mastering 
the right time for the coup is a technical art shared by hunters, 
fishermen, warriors, politicians, fortune-tellers, sponsored by 
Athena, this daughter of Zeus and Métis (DETIENNE; VERNANT 
2008, p. 9-14); Zeus is created, not The Creator, and therefore 
the opening of the Kairós, the instant, is recorded in the body 
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of time as vision and gestation without language, without face, 
without power, without time.
This mystery favors the transmutation of Kairós into a 
religious concept with a very long history of theological, mystical 
and philosophical interpretations, on which I will not dwell. The 
scope of Kairós in Jewish-Christian theologies since the Antiquity 
itself is immense and is far beyond my purpose here. But as it 
plays a crucial role for understanding the revolutionary instant 
in Benjamin, the notion of Kairós has a fundamental meaning 
in the discussion about time and the body of time in philosophy 
of history. It is from Benjamin’s theses that I can properly 
discuss the Kairós, the instant of danger and reminiscence, 
stating that Kairós is the return, the possible and even the 
impossible of transformation and differentiation in the body 
of time (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 127-128), the instant that opens 
itself to the event, and for this reason is always active virtuality 
(AGAMBEN 2008, p. 111-128; MARRAMAO 2007; MARRAMAO 
2008; NEGRI 2003, p. 63-70).
I will follow Lowy (2005, p. 13-32), Sarlo (2007), Cantinho 
(2008) and Agamben (2008, p. 129-150; 2015, p. 185-210) 
closely, seeking an analysis of Benjamin’s theses On the Concept 
of History, particularly those in which the importance of the three 
dimensions of Greek temporality to the question of the eruption 
of the instant in the historical process can be perceived in spite 
of the foundations that the problem may have for the author 
himself. We are accustomed to creating a correlation between 
the philosophy of history in Benjamin and Jewish theology, 
considering not only its explicit references, but also the evocation 
of the mystical and Jewish thinker Walter Benjamin by Scholem 
(SCHOLEM 1976; 2008; see MOSÈS 2008). The approximation 
I will make here between the historical time of the theses and 
the three Greek dimensions of the mythical body of time is 
The angel of history
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my responsibility, although Agamben (2015) has opened this 
possibility insofar as it also deals with the insertion of the theses 
– mostly with the figure of the angel of history - in a more 
encompassing tradition, including Greco-Roman philosophy.
Certainly, the problematization of temporality is fundamental 
in all theses. It is fundamental and intriguing as, for example, in 
the changes of the second thesis, whose text is long and proposes 
the connection between happiness, past and redemption, but 
not exactly through the choice of chains of events; rather, 
“happiness” and redemption come from a subtle relationship 
with non-event, with the possible experienced in the “same air 
we breathe” — we and the generations that preceded us, in what 
we did not have. From this long text we extract the question:
[…] Does not a breath of air blow upon us, which enveloped 
those who were before us? Does it not resonate in the voices 
to which we hear an echo of those who are now silent? And the 
women we court, don’t they have sisters they’ve never met? [...] 
(BENJAMIN, thesis II, p. 48)
And the conclusion of the proposal:
[...] If so, a secret meeting is marked between the past 
generations and ours. So, we were expected on earth. Then we 
were given, as well as to each generation that preceded us, a 
weak messianic force, to which the past has pretension [...]. 
(BENJAMIN, thesis II, p. 48)
The linear, circular or instantaneous time will not be of great 
help here. Because the generation that has come before us is 
present, as well as are the sisters who may never be known 
by the women we court. Instead of representing time spatially, 
the myth or tale of the waters of the same river is the one that 
best assists us in understanding what, in this thesis, has the 
impetus to modify our understanding of historical time. This 
secret meeting between generations is always marked, just 
as we always find the same course of the river in the passage 
of time. The messianic force is the driving force and unites 
what should never have been separated in the conception of 
becoming: the positivity of the destructive force that ends 
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and creates at the same time, leaving behind “possibles” 
that accompany us during the whole time. In this sense, the 
encounter marked with the generations that preceded us, just 
as we have preceded other generations, is the dynamics that 
makes us careful and attentive, à l’ordre du jour (thesis III). 
And historical time does not “walk”, rather it stops and urges.5
To articulate the past historically does not mean to know 
it “as it really was”. It means appropriating reminiscence, 
just as it flashes in an instant of danger. It is up to historical 
materialism to fix an image of the past, as it presents itself at 
the moment of danger to the historical subject, without being 
aware of it. Danger threatens both the existence of tradition 
and those who receive it. For both, the danger is the same: to 
surrender to the ruling classes, as their instrument. In each 
epoch, one has to tear tradition apart from conformism, which 
wants to seize it. For the Messiah does not come only as a 
savior; he also comes as the vanquisher of the Antichrist. The 
gift of awakening in the past the sparks of hope is the exclusive 
privilege of the historian convinced that the dead too will not 
be safe if the enemy wins. And this enemy has not ceased to 
win. (BENJAMIN, thesis VI, p.65).
In terms of the factual, that is, of the writing about “what 
happened”, “seizing history” takes us back to a past that is 
reminiscent, and to appropriate reminiscences according to another 
point of view is a compelling task of a historian who recognizes 
the danger of the present: surrendering to the traditions of the 
ruling classes (thesis VII). According to the theses, historicism in 
its rigor applied to a single causal process favors the reproduction 
of the same significant events, of the same facts, of the same 
heroes. As long as the oppressed do not seize history, they will 
not seize the future. In the dimension of historical thought, of the 
perception and consciousness of the revolutionary subject, history 
(reminiscence) and the future are present at the same instant, a 
flash. In terms of becoming, seizing history means interrupting it, 
diverting it and blowing up the timeline.
5 - The historical ma-
terialist cannot renou-
nce the concept of a 
present that is not a 
transition, but in whi-
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The explosion of the line refers to a small text of 1979, in 
which Foucault tries to reject criticisms in Le Monde that had 
been made to him for having given sympathetic declarations to 
the Iranian revolutionary process. In the beginning, according 
to him, a revolutionary outburst; later, a fundamentalist 
government that is inadmissible to European liberals. In 
explaining himself, Foucault emphasized the moment when the 
rebellious man assumes the absolute risk and imposes a “no” 
to the prevailing order. I read Foucault’s text on the Iranian 
revolution with deep attention to the echoes of Thesis VI, even 
though there was no intention on the part of the author to refer 
to it. In Is it useless to revolt? Foucault says that the uprising 
is a fact, for “that is where subjectivity introduces itself into 
history and gives it the breath of life”. (FOUCAULT 1979, p.12)
There are different ways of interpreting this movement. For 
example, are we facing a process of growing awareness that 
transforms action and unfolds praxis? I do not think so, since the 
urgency and absolute risk spoken of by Benjamin and Foucault 
involve a leap rather than a consciousness or the representation 
of the self in action. In addition, I would agree with Lefebvre’s 
critique upon the philosophies that separate everyday life and 
praxis by throwing the everyday life out of history itself. The 
relationship between everydayness and alienation marks the 
philosophies of Marx, Hegel, Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and it is 
in his critique to that mark that Lefebvre perceives in everyday 
life the concrete conditions of appropriation and revolt. That is 
where subjectivity enters history... and therefore, it was not in 
history before, it will not be there after, but now, that is, always. 
This is a problem. “Something” that is always there, whose 
historical nature is to stop, to erupt, to urge and not exactly to 
walk in line, to think or to exist. What is this subjectivity that is 
so devoided of the substance contained in the very philosophical 
definition of subjectum?
It is a filament of ethos, subjectivity from the perspective 
of the universal that literally introduces itself into history in 
an instant of danger, giving it the breath of life: a daimon, the 
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flapping of the wings of a terrifying angel. A non subjective 
subjectivity, therefore; because ethos does not refer to the 
psychological tendencies of individuals, but to universal lines 
of becoming, lines of possibility in the dynamics of becoming 
“someone” or the daimon that dwells in man, as Heraclitus 
says (HERACLITUS fr.119).6 “Demonic” in the Greek sense of 
daimon — different from the demonic as criticized by Agamben 
in Scholem (SCHOLEM 1976, p. 198-236) — the subjectivity that 
is introduces itself in history, history in the face of the universal, 
constitutes an impasse at the same time, a negation and a 
point of mutation. Foucault had in mind the irreducible in the 
uprising, when an ethical subject imposes to power an absolute 
not on the horizon of his own death and thus of his annihilation. 
But what is history in the light of the annihilated subject? Does 
it not seem contradictory that a breath of life “enters” at the 
very moment when the rebel decides to die? A utopia tears the 
threads; the subject of history does not change oneself without 
an instant of decision: “Messianic time is rather a time of action, 
because only through action we become revolutionary subjects, 
subjects capable of effecting a conversion from the political to 
the messianic” (MARRAMAO 2008, p. 402). Paradoxically, this 
instant is the point of annihilation of a life, an infinitesimal point 
in which free will is impossible simply because infinity does 
not concern it. This cosmic place is one in which the moment 
happens dangerously, releasing the chains of events from their 
assumed, past, present, and future identities. It is important to 
point out that when Benjamin connects the instant to the Last 
Judgment and to the Redemption in a Philosophy of History, the 
philosopher allows us to glimpse what is out of history but in 
no way transcends the being in the world. Like the “demonic”, 
subjectivity exists and does not exist.
In this sense, the historical subject becomes a revolutionary. 
I do not understand this revolutionary (the historian by whom 
Benjamin claims) as the subject of the sentence, nor as that 
localized atom which a tradition fixes as the point of origin 
of acts, causes, and intentions: Man. I do not understand it 
either, primarily (recognizing that for Benjamin, differently, 
6 - http://www.hera-
clitusfragments.com/
files/ge.html  (acess 
4 Feb. 2018)
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this was an important point), as that individual willing to 
do everything to change reality. I do not understand it as a 
person. I understand as revolutionary the subject of history 
from the point of view of an engagement that deconstructs 
subjectivity as the representation of oneself, its particularity, 
and incorporates it into the body of time, at the moment when 
the possible remembrance opens the nature of things, giving 
meaning to the daily lived experience by the memory of what 
was not (as said in the second thesis discussed above); when 
what was said is not a question , not what was done, not what 
was built; when the potential to destroy is urgent.
Thus, the angel of history presented in thesis IX is not the 
master, but the perpetrator of that power. He does not rule and 
should not rule the mutation, he is moved by the necessary 
ruin that the flapping of his wings contributes to accumulate 
(GANDLER 2013, p. 537-1238). The ruined image of the past 
(BENJAMIN, thesis IX), the image of a future that risks retaking 
the past is therefore fundamental. Because the reminiscences, 
the debris, are presented to the one who will come. Entering 
history, claiming its potency outside linear time, in the interim 
in which the imagination stops and receives the breath of 
reminiscence in a flap of wings, is the anti-historicist gesture 
capable of remaking the truth with which the author walks 
(BENJAMIN, thesis XVI, p. 128); this is the horizon of praxis 
in which an expression such as “historical subjectivity” gains, 
in my understanding, a more adequate conceptual foundation 
than those that separate “subject” and “object”, “experience” 
and “narrative”, “representation” and “practice”, “conceived” 
and “lived” at the very core of action (CRANE 2006, p. 434-456; 
TUCKER 2013, p. 205-229).
Qui le croirait! on dit qu’irrités contre l’heure 
De nouveaux Josués, au pied de chaque tour, 
Tiraient sur les cadrans pour arrêter le jour.7
7 - “Who would belie-
ve! It is said that they 
were irritated against 
the time / New 
Joshua, at the foot of 
each tower, shooting 
the chimes to stop the 
day”. Excerpt quoted 
by Benjamin in the 
thesis XV, p. 129.
Final considerations
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Future-past dialectics in the experience of historical time impels 
our understanding of the becoming towards a representation of 
the nature of mutant things as process, procedure, development, 
unfolding, ultimately, chains of combinations that “lead” in one 
direction (even if that direction is only apprehended a posteriori), 
often towards the “new”, as if to differ was largely the same as 
to innovate. The evolution of the species, millennialism, the end 
of capitalism, the expanding universe, all imply transformation 
in linear time. Even dialectics has often been taken in a unique 
sense in the movement of contradiction in the eternal return 
of transformation. A mythical narrative, thus, makes no sense 
as “History”; it does not have this statute for us, also because, 
since it is generally associated with the rite, we tend to see it 
as a ritual operation and not as a presentiment of the past, a 
retaking of the ethos to the cosmos and to the child kingdom of 
“always”; and when we see this, we call it “religion”, mysticism. 
But what if the theology and mysticism of a philosopher like 
Benjamin create a possible language for the expression of a 
philosophy of materialist History? It is symptomatic that 
immanence in historical materialism and other historiographical 
strands depends entirely on the concreteness of facts in a 
linear time; but the question of how to reach a verdict on the 
concreteness, meaning and relevance of the facts is not as it 
should be, inasmuch effectiveness, meaning, and importance 
are values rather than laws. It is encouraging that Benjamin 
and others, like Agamben, provide us with mystical concepts for 
effecting a profoundly materialistic thought which significance 
is devoided of the primacy of the acknowledgment of events 
disposed in causal threads driven by the time of the passing 
hours, a political historical thought that observes scintillations in 
the margins, details on the edges, folds in the remains of what 
we build, proceeding by leaps. A thought that preserves the 
memory of destruction and the recovery in each new unfolding.
Every conception of history is always accompanied by a certain 
experience of time which is implicit to it, which conditions it and 
which must therefore be brought to light. In the same way, every 
culture is, first, a certain experience of time, and a new culture 
is not possible without a transformation of this experience. 
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Therefore, the original task of an authentic revolution is not 
imply to “change the world”, but also, and above all, to “change 
time” [...] (AGAMBEN 2008, p. 111).
Can we change the way we understand History by “changing 
time”? The image of the boy running in the square of the French 
Revolution is understandable as a historical image considering 
this questioning. The temporality lost and regained in the body 
of vivid time of becoming is not expressed by the ticking of the 
clock and is not expressed in a concatenated process, it does 
not need it in order to change the way of being of things, the 
way of seeing things, the action, the imitation of the action does 
not, in fact, produce capital, but waste, scintillations, especially 
in fragmentary vestiges in built castles - “as dust, rain takes 
its revenge on the arcades” (BENJAMIN 2009, p. 143 [D1a, 1]). 
We need, therefore, to experience histories with possibles 
(BENJAMIN, thesis XVII, p. 130; I also refer to TARDE 2007, 
p. 193-233). That is to say: to write history by bonding with 
that which potentially reconfigures the world not because it is 
necessary to give it a new face, but because it is necessary 
to repeat the feat of Prometheus: to steal the fire of the gods 
and give it to mortals. Political achievement par excellence, 
an arduous attempt to undo the divine deed, as the myth of 
the origin of the gods in Hesiod tells us — which can also be 
read as the myth of the origin of time, according to Jacques 
Fontanille (2015, p. 117-192). To undo the deed, the first step 
is to disconcert natural time from its normal course, which, 
in fact, mystifies us more than the mythical body of time. For 
our relationship with history, what puts us before the mirror as 
individual and collective subjects of conjunctures and processes 
is not the concatenated narrative of facts, but precisely the 
rejoicing of remembrance, that is the now of the past. The 
possibility of remembering brings with it the staggering force of 
destroying worlds; but the return of the historical narrative to a 
univocal image of linear time condemns us to the reproduction 
of the line of a single drama: the drama of repetition by the 
oppressed of the oppressor’s model of history.
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It is necessary to emphasize that it is not the truth of the 
explanations of the concatenated historical processes that is 
in question since the problem of temporality is a problem of 
magma, of what underlies and is safeguarded in the writing of 
history, outside of it. We know that you do not have to make the 
same connection to everything; maybe it is not even desirable 
and probably something impossible. We know the value of de-
structuring processes, denaturalizing rhythms and change, to 
which I add only one final note: events, causality, and history 
do not walk under the guidance of the hours, despite our 
expectations. They walk with the power. Perhaps this is one of the 
happiest lessons of the theses: is no good to those who intend to 
change the course of a life to experience in time something that 
weighs on their back and escapes under their fingers without 
redemption. It is no good to reproduce yesterday’s powers, that 
is to say, the powers of yesterday, today and tomorrow. Thus, 
it is not of our interest to go on reproducing a line or a lineage. 
The mythic body of time, its image as soul (Aiôn, eternity of 
becoming), limbs (Chrónos, the dynamics of passage), the 
“pulse that still pulses” (Kairós, the urgency of the right time 
of action) gives to those who need to change the course of life 
— of their life and of the common life8 — a horizon to dialogue 
with things, a horizon that is opened to what has been muted 
in them or simply were not, in the course of their invisibility. 
The body of time is a juncture or rather a co-juncture, and the 
challenge is to make History a science for the transformation of 
the present by its tenacity — a weak messianic force (thesis II) 
— in the excavation of ruins. For me, in particular, history is an 
instrument of sewing in a horizon of utopia.
AGAMBEN, Giorgio. Infância e História. Destruição da 
Experiência e Origem da História. Traduzido por Henrique 
Burigo. Belo Horizonte: ed. UFMG, 2008.
8 - “Just as [historical 
materialism] explo-
des a definite life of 
an epoch, so it also 
does to a particular 
work of the work of a 
life” (BENJAMIN, the-
sis XVII, p. 130)
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